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Abstract.  All democratic systems are theoretically open to so-called election in-
versions, i.e., instances wherein a majority of the decision makers prefer one al-
ternative but where the actual outcome is another.  The paper examines the 
complex 1975 Danish government formation process, which involved five 
rounds of negotiations and at least five competing alternatives.   We demon-
strate that in terms of party preferences the final outcome was not the Condor-
cet winner but rather one that could have been beaten by at least three other 
government alternatives in head-to-head comparisons.  The Danish procedural 
system of “negative” parliamentarism combined with simple plurality rule to 
produce the electoral inversion. 
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“Politically, it [i.e., the parliamentary situation] is rather impossible.” 
 
Poul Hartling, Danish Prime Minister,  
in his diary, following the 1975 election 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It would seem counterintuitive for a parliamentary democracy to 
produce a government that is less preferred than other alternatives 
by a majority of parliament (cf. Dahl 1989; Miller 2011). Nonetheless, 
                                           
1 I am grateful to Lars Bille, Flemming Juul Christiansen, Jørgen Elklit, Jacob 
Hariri, Michael Munger, Mogens N. Pedersen, and especially Bill Shughart for 
discussions, suggestions and helpful comments related to this paper.  The paper 
was written as an Academic Visitor at Nuffield College, Oxford, 2012. 
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as social choice theorists have been pointing out for decades, if not 
centuries, whenever three or more actors must choose between three 
or more alternatives, it is logically possible for situations to exist 
wherein the chosen alternative could be beaten by at least one of the 
other options (Condorcet [1785] 1994; Condorcet [1789] 1994; 
McLean and Urken 1995). 
This may occur because there is a “cycle” in the preferences of the 
decision makers, whereby there simply is no so-called “Condorcet 
winner”, i.e., an alternative that cannot be defeated by a majority 
favoring at least one other available alternative in head-to-head 
comparisons.  In such a case, whatever the outcome happens to be 
is, another will be preferred.  Put differently, every option defeats 
every other option in pairwise, simple majority rule votes.  While 
seemingly rare, such examples are found in the real world  (Riker 
1982) and also occasionally in Danish politics (Kurrild-Klitgaard 
2001; cf. Kurrild-Klitgaard 2008).  The problem may also occur when 
the decision-making procedure is such that it allows an alternative 
to win without being able to beat all other alternatives in head-to-
head comparisons, either because of a “defect” in the procedure or 
because of strategic behavior by the decision-makers—phenomena 
found widely in politics (Riker 1982; Riker 1986).  These two 
problematic outcomes—the possibilities that no Condorcet winner 
exists and that a non-Condorcet winner is selected, even when a 
Condorcet winner exists—are both known to become more likely as 
either the number of choosers or the number of alternatives under 
consideration increase, especially when the electoral rule merely 
demands a plurality of the votes rather than a majority (Wright and 
Riker 1989: 156). 
If a multi-party political system is such that the process of 
government formation allows a winner to be selected by a plurality 
(rather than by an absolute majority), and if there is no requirement 
of a formal investiture vote, whereby the MPs need to “come out” as 
to whether or not they support a given government, the result may 
conceivably be one with a government that more than half of the 
parliamentarians oppose.  Such is the case in the parliamentary 
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political system of Denmark, at least potentially  (Kurrild-Klitgaard 
2005), but how often—if ever—does it occur in practice?  A possibly 
instructive empirical case to consider is the formation of the Danish 
government in 1975, since the process resulted in the winner (the 
incoming government) that was supported by less than a majority of 
the members of parliament (42%, in fact).  The government 
formation process that led to this outcome was one of the most 
complex and lengthy (in terms of “rounds”) in Danish political 
history.2  Furthermore, it was unique in that the negotiations leading 
to the eventual appointment of the new government included an 
intermezzo wherein an alternative government’s new ministers 
were all dressed up and almost literally on the way to their 
appointed posts and had to be stopped on short notice.  The leading 
historian of modern Danish governments (Kaarsted 1988) has 
referred to that event as “the government we never had” 
(“Regeringen vi aldrig fik”). 
The purpose of the present analysis is not to rehearse all of the 
details of the 1975 government formation process, but rather to try 
to identify the various parties’ preferences over the alternatives as 
they appeared in the final stages.  The purpose will be to use social 
choice theory to investigate the extent to which the government 
ultimately formed may have been something other than the 
Condorcet winner.  If that was the case, it will be evidence of an 
inherent and counterintuitive flaw in the Danish democratic process 
and not one that is simply an armchair possibility.  In the following 
we shall do this by first giving an overview of the historical events 
as they unfolded in January-February 1975 (section 1), then try to 
reconstruct the political parties’ preferences over government 
alternatives (section 2), and finally to analyze the collective 
preference vis-à-vis the real-world outcome (section 3). 
                                           
2 Another lengthy and complex government formation was that of 1957, in 
which a majority of the seats went to the non-socialist parties, but the end result 
was a coalition government headed by the Social Democrats in partnership with 
the Radicals and the “Georgist” single-tax Justice Party.  See Kaarsted [1964] 
1969, 1988). 
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2. The 1975 government formation 
 
2.1. The Danish government formation process 
The Danish parliament consists of 179 members, whereof 175 are 
elected in “continental” Denmark, while the two semi-autonomous 
North Atlantic territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands each 
have two MPs.  Danish government formations are guided by a few 
formal rules found in the Constitution and a number of informal 
norms that have evolved during the 20th century.3  In essence, the 
process of government formation is initiated after a Prime Minister 
has resigned, either voluntarily or forced out by parliament, or after 
a general election when the incumbent government has lost its 
parliamentary majority.  The (acting) Prime Minister typically 
advises the monarch to initiate a “round” of consultations amongst 
the political parties, in the course of which their leaders visit the 
royal palace of Amalienborg in order of party size.  During these 
consultations the various parties each present the monarch with 
written advice as to whom they think should form a new 
government, possibly including a number of stated goals or 
limitations.  The pieces of advice are then summarized by the 
Queen’s Cabinet Secretary in terms of how many MPs are behind 
the various alternatives and the result is—in practice—interpreted 
by the acting Prime Minister and his office.  The rule applied 
informally is one of simple plurality rather than of absolute 
majority, so that if, say, 85 of the 179 members support alternative A, 
80 support alternative B and 14 support some other alternatives or 
give no specific advice, then A will be given the task of forming a 
new government.  The constitution and evolved practice have meant 
                                           
3  On the procedures and empirical evidence with respect to government 
formation in Denmark, see Elklit (1999), Damgaard (2000) and Skjæveland 
(2003). On some of its problems when seen in a social choice perspective, see 
Kurrild-Klitgaard (2005,  2013). 
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that a government does not need to face a formal investiture vote 
but cannot be formed if it is known that there will be a majority 
against it. 
 
2.2. The 1973-1975 elections 
 
The 1973 election for the Danish parliament, the Folketing, was 
seminal in modern Danish politics and is usually called “the 
landslide” or “earthquake” election, since the number of political 
parties represented doubled, from five to ten, an unprecedented 
one-third of the incumbent MPs running lost their seats, and “the 
four old parties” (Social Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives and 
Radicals), which had ruled the country since World War I, were 
weakened significantly.  Particularly noteworthy was the emergence 
of a new second largest party, the right-wing populist, anti-tax 
Progress Party, led by the intelligent but somewhat erratic and 
eccentric Mogens Glistrup (1926-2008).  The end result was a highly 
fractionalized parliament wherein the traditional patterns of 
coalitions and collaboration broke down.  The government coming 
out of the 1973 election had a feeble parliamentary base, consisting 
of only one party, the Liberals, led by former Foreign Minister Poul 
Hartling (1914-2000), who had only 22 of the parliament’s 179 MPs 
behind him and a cabinet so small that many ministers were 
responsible for more than one policy area.  Hartling encountered 
serious problems getting his post-1973 OPEC oil embargo “crisis 
policies” through parliament and in December 1974—after only a 
little more than a year in office—called an early election for January 
9th 1975.  The unspoken purpose was to get a parliamentary majority 
independent of both the Progress Party (on the right) and parties on 
the far left. 
In essence, the choice emerging on the basis of the 1973-75 
sessions of parliament was between either a center-right 
government (consisting of the Liberals and one or more other 
parties), headed by Hartling and backed by the Liberals, the 
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Conservatives, the Christians, the Center-Democrats and the 
Progress Party, or a left-wing government backed by the socialist 
parties (the Social Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party, the 
Communists and the Left-Socialists) and headed by Anker 
Jørgensen (1922-), leader of the Social Democrats and himself a 
former Prime Minister (1972-73).  The Radicals—often the median 
party in Danish politics—viewed (perhaps owing to internal 
divisions) these options as a choice between cholera and the plague 
and most of all saw the solution to the highly fractionalized and 
unstable parliamentary situation as being one of a broad, multi-
party majority government coalition including both Social 
Democrats and one or more center-right parties (Kaarsted 1988: 50).  
The latter sentiments were to some extent shared by the 
Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Center-
Democrats, although if given a binary choice they surely preferred 
Hartling over Jørgensen as Prime Minister, whereas the Social 
Democrats were unwilling to let anyone but themselves head a 
government in which they took part (Kaarsted 1988: 48ff). 
 
 
Table 1. Outcome of Danish general election 9th of January 1975. 
Party Seats 
Progress Party 24 
Conservative People’s Party 10 
Liberal Party 42 
Christian People’s Party 9 
Center-Democrats 4 
Radicals 13 
Social Democrats 53 
Socialist People’s Party 9 
Danish Communist Party 7 
Left-Socialists 4 
Note: Parties are arranged from right (top) to left (bottom). 
 
 
Overall, the outcome of the January 9th election was an unchanged 
status quo in terms of the ideological “blocs”.  Table 1 lists the seat 
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allocations, with the parties placed on the familiar left-right 
dimension found to be quite ubiquitous in Danish politics, both in 
terms of voter preferences and party behavior (Kurrild-Klitgaard, 
Klemmensen and Pedersen 2008), going from “right” (top) to “left” 
(bottom).4 
Although the election did not change much, some realignments 
materialized within the blocs. Most notably the number of seats held 
by the Liberal Party of Prime Minister Hartling almost doubled 
(from 22 to 42 MPs) and came close to rivaling the once so all-
dominant Social Democrats (53) in size.  This success created some 
tensions between Hartling’s Liberals and the smaller center-right 
parties that had supported his one-party minority government, but 
whose parliamentary survival was endangered by the Liberals’ 
“political cannibalism”. 
The parliamentary situation was a mess.  Including the Radicals 
there were a total of 102 non-socialist MPs (out of 179), but only by 
spanning parties that more or less intensely disliked each other’s 
policies.  The left wing controlled a total of 73 of the 179 seats.  
Adding the Radicals (who historically often had supported or joined 
Social Democrat governments) would only give the left 86 seats, still 
shy of an absolute majority.  On the other side, the picture was even 
less clear: The four center-right parties controlled a total of 65 of the 
179 seats; adding the Radicals would give control of only 78 seats, 
also a non-majority.  Adding the Progress Party’s 24 MPs to the four 
center-right parties would be hard to swallow for many, but that at 
least would provide a working majority (89 seats). 
The latter was a consequence of the aforementioned fact of 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands each having two seats in 
parliament.  In general, the four North Atlantic representatives take 
                                           
4 The specific ordering made here—Progress Party/Conservative People’s 
Party/Liberal Party/Christian People’s Party/Center-Democrats/Radicals/Social 
Democrats/Socialist People’s Party/Danish Communist Party/Left-Socialists—is 
based in the legislative voting behavior of the parties in the 1975-77 sessions 
using the so-called Distance Index (cf. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Klemmensen and 
Pedersen 2008: 196f). 
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a stand only when their votes will make a difference in the outcome 
and then usually support the Danish parties with which they 
caucus, and in such situations they have played a decisive role in 
government formations (cf. Skjæveland 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard 
2013).  Following the 1975 election, the four “non-continental” MPs 
split evenly between the right and the left, thus making it possible to 
have an absolute majority even if the parties in a coalition controlled 
only 88 or 89 of the 179 seats (cf. Kaarsted 1988: 51). 
 
2.3. The informal rounds of negotiations 
 
Hartling’s parliamentary hope of avoiding being dependent on the 
Progress Party had failed.  However, Hartling and his government 
technically had not resigned when he called the election and so in 
principle he was not forced to go through a new formal round of 
government-formation negotiations.  Nonetheless, a majority of 
parliament wanted such negotiations—either because they wanted 
to get into a government themselves, wanted a totally different 
government, or simply wanted a stronger, more stable government 
(cf. Kaarsted 1988: 52f).  The day following the election Hartling 
engaged the political parties in informal negotiations about a 
possible new government.  Hartling’s conclusion on January 11th 
was that 73 MPs (Social Democrats, Socialist People’s Party, 
Communists and Left-Socialists) wanted a new prime minister, 
while 102 had not recommended a replacement (Kaarsted 1988: 54). 
 So, initially, Hartling’s government simply continued, although 
now with many more Liberal MPs.  But then what Kaarsted called 
“an orgy of tactics” began to unfold.  Negotiations during the 
following weeks over support for the government’s economic 
policies and the annual budget were difficult and stalled.  On the 
28th of January the Social Democrats (following negotiations with 
the Radicals and the Socialist People’s Party) proposed a motion in 
parliament calling on the government to resign and initiate a formal 
round of negotiations for the purpose of forming “a broad majority 
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government” (Kaarsted 1988: 69).  At the subsequent roll call three 
MPs were absent, while five MPs abstained (four Center-Democrats 
and one Conservative MP); the motion was opposed by 85 of the 179 
MPs (Liberals, Conservatives, Christians, Progress Party), but 
passed with a mere one-vote plurality (86) in favor (Radicals, Social 
Democrats, Socialist People’s Party, Communists, Left-Socialists).5 
 
2.4. The first formal round 
 
The following day, January 29th, Hartling handed in his resignation 
to the Queen and what would become the first of a total of four 
formal rounds of government formation (so-called “Queen’s 
rounds”) began.6  An extraordinarily complex set of 
recommendations gave a result that was interpreted as 89 MPs 
supporting a proposal that the Radical chairman of the Folketing, 
Karl Skytte (1908-1986), would lead negotiations for the purpose of 
forming a majority coalition government (supported by the 
Radicals, the Social Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party, and the 
Center-Democrats).  Another set of recommendations was 
interpreted as showing that 75 MPs (Liberals, Progress Party, 
Conservatives, Christians) wanted the task to be assigned to 
Hartling.  The remainder (Communists, Left-Socialists) 
recommended that the negotiations be led by an unnamed Social 
Democrat. 
 Skytte was given the role—as the first such ever in Danish 
politics—of “royal investigator” (kongelig undersøger), i.e., as 
someone having the task of negotiating a government formation but 
without the responsibility of actually forming such a government 
(with himself as leader).  On January 30th Skytte met with 
                                           
5 For a more detailed treatment, see Kaarsted (1988: 69-71).  Of the four North-
Atlantic MPs one was absent, one voted against, and two in favor, i.e., with the 
three aligning themselves with parties with whom they caucused. 
6 For a more detailed treatment of the first round of government formation, see 
Kaarsted (1988: 78-88). 
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delegations from the political parties for negotiations, which 
proceeded in great detail for more than a week, until he, on 
February 7th 1975, went to the Queen to inform her that he saw no 
possibility of forming a broad majority government. 
 
2.5. The second formal round 
 
Now, a second round of government formation negotiations could 
begin, again with the parties visiting the Queen to present their 
advice on what to do next (cf. Table 2).7  Following yet another 
series of complicated recommendations, the results were tabulated 
as follows: parties representing 85 MPs recommended that the 
acting Prime Minister, Hartling, should be given the task of 
negotiating the formation of a new government (Liberals, Progress 
Party, Conservatives, Christians), while 86 backed Jørgensen (Social 
Democrats, Radicals, Socialist People’s Party, Communists, Left-
Socialists).  The Center-Democrats repeated the suggestion of Skytte, 
alternatively the leader of one of the two largest parties.  The North-
Atlantic MPs did not participate.  The Queen then asked Jørgensen 
to lead the negotiations but with the instruction that he had to 
propose a majority government.  Within less than 24 hours (7th-8th of 
February) Jørgensen could conclude that there was no possibility of 
him negotiating the formation of such a government. 
 
2.6. The third formal round 
 
On Sunday the 9th, exactly a month after the election, the third 
formal “Queen’s round” began at the royal palace of Amalienborg.8  
This time the recommendations were somewhat easier to tabulate 
and interpret (cf. Table 2): Parties representing 89 MPs 
                                           
7 On the second round of government formation, see Kaarsted (1988: 89-95). 
8 On the third round of government formation, see Kaarsted (1988: 96-108). 
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recommended that Hartling be given the task: Liberals, Progress 
Party, Conservatives, Center-Democrats and Christians.  The only 
qualification was that the latter suggested that at least three parties 
should form the coalition.  Parties representing 75 MPs 
recommended Jørgensen (Social Democrats, Socialist People’s Party, 
Communists, Left-Socialists), while the 13 Radicals realized that a 
majority government could not be formed and in acknowledgment 
of that fact recommended that an unspecified minority government 
be formed.  So, in contrast to Jørgensen, Hartling now had not only a 
plurality but also a “working majority”, since he could count on an 
additional two North-Atlantic MPs.  Hartling’s situation as acting 
Prime Minister and government formateur with a majority was quite 
strong, and on the evening of the 9th he announced that he would 
proceed to negotiate the formation of a four-party government with 
the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Center-
Democrats; over the next day the four parties agreed on a program 
and divided the cabinet posts between them, with Hartling set to 
continue as Prime Minister.  However, they had not expected the 
reaction from a disappointed Progress Party, with whom they only 
wanted to negotiate policies and not posts.  On Monday the 10th of 
February 1975 Mogens Glistrup stated on national television that 
such a four-party government (without his party) would soon be 
faced with a majority against it.  This was obviously a strategic 
move in order to force Hartling to include the Progress Party, since 
Glistrup knew that it could be perceived as being constitutionally 
problematic for Hartling to recommend to the Queen that she 
should appoint a government that would not be able to survive its 
first meeting with parliament. 
The next morning the new cabinet members-to-be met.  
“Everything was ready now”, Hartling noted in his diary.  
However, he decided to meet with the leaders of the Radicals and 
the Social Democrats to ascertain that they would not greet the new 
government with an immediate vote of confidence (and vote no). 
When he was not able to receive such unconditional assurance, and 
while Glistrup simultaneously continued to make erratic comments 
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in public, Hartling made the fatal decision to ask for a new “Queen’s 
round” to clarify matters. 
 
2.7. The fourth and final round 
 
The last round of negotiations began on Tuesday the 11th of 
February (cf. Table 2).9  Here the same 75 MPs who had supported 
Jørgensen in round 3 recommended that he form “the broadest 
possible government”, while the leaders of the 13 Radicals repeated 
their vague recommendation.  The four parties behind Hartling’s 
negotiated coalition (Liberals, Conservatives, Christians, Center-
Democrats) held the line and recommended that Hartling be given 
the task of forming a government comprising them.  The Progress 
Party did not trust Hartling this time around and submitted a very 
complex and detailed recommendation that, in essence, would force 
Hartling either to include the Progress Party in the cabinet or give it 
veto power.  Without the Progress Party’s 24 seats combining with 
the 65 recommending a four-party government, there was now a 
plurality behind Jørgensen bound by no conditions.  It was clear 
from the beginning that Jørgensen aimed for a Social Democratic 
minority government with himself as head, and he formed such a 
government on the 13th of February 1975.  Jørgensen continued as 
Prime Minister for the next seven years, albeit as leader of a long 
series of unstable and weak governments, interrupted by frequent 
elections (in 1977, 1979 and 1981). 
                                           
9 On the fourth and final round of government formation, see Kaarsted (1988: 
109-112). 
Table 2. Danish government formation, February 1975, 2nd-4th rounds: Processes and hypothesized preference orderings. 
Party (seats) 
Hypothesized 
preference ordering 
2nd round, 7th of February 1975 3rd round, 9th of February 1975 4th round, 11th of February 1975 
Progress Party (24) 
 
R > (L ~ C) > G > S 
Advice: Hartling to form government. 
Known preferences: Wanted a right-wing government; did explicitly not want a 
Social Democrat (Kaarsted 1988: 70 & 73f). Signaled that they were interested in 
joining a majority government, one way or another (Kaarsted 1988: 57). 
Advice: Hartling to form government. 
Known preferences: Demanded influ-
ence and preferred a narrow Liberal 
government to a multiparty govern-
ment without themselves (Kaarsted 
1988: 101). 
Advice: A government based in “a 
formalized collaboration among at 
least 89 MPs, either a ‘magistrate go-
vernment’ or a majority government 
or a [one party] Liberal government, 
which will follow the political deci-
sions made in a parliamentary com-
mittee, about whose work there is 
agreement among at least 89 MPs.” 
Conservative People’s 
Party (10) 
 
C > G > R > L > S 
Advice: Hartling to form government, preferably a majority government. 
Known preferences: Had repeatedly stated that they wanted a broad and/or ma-
jority government (Kaarsted 1988: 50). Preferred a center-right government, with-
out Progress Party, but the latter was not a cardinal issue (Kaarsted 1988: 62f). 
Wanted to be a part of such a government. 
Advice: Hartling to form government. Advice: Hartling to form government. 
Liberal Party (42) 
 
L > C > G > (R ~ S) 
Advice: Hartling to form government. 
Known preferences: Probably ideally would prefer a continuation of a one-party 
(Liberal) minority government, i.e., L > all other alternatives. Would prefer not to 
be dependent on Progress Party. 
Advice: Hartling to form government. Advice: Hartling to form government. 
Christian People’s 
Party (9) 
 
C > G > L > R > S 
Advice: Hartling to form government, preferably a majority government and one 
consisting of at least three parties. 
Known preferences: Most preferred a broad majority government, with them-
selves as participants (Kaarsted 1988: 50). Called a government with only Liberals 
“the least of evils” (Kaarsted 1988: 50). Willing to collaborate in some form with 
Progress Party (Kaarsted 1988: 64f). 
Advice: Hartling to form government 
with at least three parties. 
Advice: Hartling to form government. 
Center-Democrats (4) 
 
G > C > L > S > R 
Advice: Chairman of Parliament (Karl Skytte) to negotiate formation of majority 
government, alternatively the largest or second-largest party. 
Known preferences: Probably most wanted a broad majority coalition (Kaarsted 
1988: 50), followed by a minority government based in a working agreement 
(Kaarsted 1988: 54). Did no want a one party Liberal government (Kaarsted 1988: 
50). Parliamentary group split between those wanting Jørgensen as prime minister 
and those wanting Hartling. Would not like a government with Progress Party. 
Advice: Hartling to form government. Advice: Hartling to form government. 
Radicals (13) 
 
G > S > (L ~ C) > R 
Advice: Social Democrats (no name) to lead formation of a majority government 
including the Social Democrats, the Radicals, the Conservatives, the Christians 
and the Center-Democrats. 
Known preferences: Disliked both a Social Democratic and a Liberal minority go-
vernment (Kaarsted 1988: 50). Claimed no strict preference over possible Prime 
Ministers (Kaarsted 1988: 50) but may have weakly preferred a Social Democrat 
Advice: A minority government (un-
specified) 
Known preferences: Broad majority 
government > (S/L) but now 
considered the former unrealistic 
(Kaarsted 1988: 96). They did not want 
Advice: A broad majority govern-
ment, alternatively a minority govern-
ment headed by either Liberals or 
Social Democrats. 
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(Kaarsted 1988: 67 & 75). Most wanted a broad coalition government (Kaarsted 
1988: 50, 61f). For ideological reasons it may be hypothesized that they preferred a 
government dependent on the Progress Party (R) least. 
to take part in a minority government 
themselves, and hence S > Social De-
mocrats + Radicals (Kaarsted 1988: 96). 
Social Democrats (53) 
 
S > G > (L ~ C ~ R) 
Advice: Jørgensen to form government. 
Known preferences: Refused to support a government led by anyone except 
themselves (Kaarsted 1988: 48ff). Could be open to broad government coalition 
(Kaarsted 1988: 48ff). 
Advice: Jørgensen to form govern-
ment. 
Advice: Jørgensen to form govern-
ment. 
Socialist People’s Party 
(9) 
 
S > G > (L ~ C ~ R) 
Advice: Jørgensen to form government. Advice: Jørgensen to form govern-
ment. 
Advice: Jørgensen to form govern-
ment. 
Danish Communist 
Party (7) 
 
S > G > (L~ C ~ R) 
Advice: Jørgensen to form government. 
Known preferences: Wanted a left-wing government. Would be willing to sup-
port a Jørgensen government in order to keep Liberals out. 
Advice: Jørgensen to form govern-
ment. 
Advice: Jørgensen to form govern-
ment. 
Left-Socialists (4) 
 
S > (G ~ L ~ C ~ R) 
Advice: A Social Democrat (unnamed) to form government. 
Known preferences: Did not want a government including non-socialist parties. 
Advice: Jørgensen to form govern-
ment. 
Advice: Jørgensen to form govern-
ment. 
Government 
formation process/ 
Outcome: 
7th February: With 85 MPs* supporting Hartling to form a government (Liberals, 
Progress Party, Conservatives, Christians) and 86 MPs* supporting Jørgensen/a 
Social Democrat (Social Democrats, Radicals, Socialists, Communists, Left-Socia-
lists) and with 4 MPs supporting (as one of several possibilities) negotiations led 
by the largest party (i.e. Social Democrats), Jørgensen was asked to investigate the 
possibility of forming a majority government. 
8th February: Jørgensen gave up. 
9th February: With 75 MPs** suppor-
ting Jørgensen to form government 
and 89 MPs supporting Hartling (and 
13 Radicals supporting a unspecified 
minority government) Hartling was 
asked by the Queen to form a 
government. 
9th-10th February: Hartling successful-
ly negotiated a four-party center-right 
minority government (Liberals, Con-
servatives, Christian, Center-Demo-
crats) (= C). 
11th February: Hartling gave up due to 
public remarks from Progress Party. 
11th February: With 75 MPs** suppor-
ting Jørgensen to form government 
and 65 MPs supporting Hartling (and 
13 Radicals supporting a broad, 
centrist majority coalition government 
or a unspecified minority government 
led by one of the major parties, and 24 
Progress Party MPs behind a center-
right majority coalition government) 
Jørgensen was asked by the Queen to 
form a government. 
13th February: Jørgensen formed a 
one-party minority government. 
Sources: Kaarsted (1988: 48ff, 89-107). Kaarsted 1988: 96-108. Kaarsted 1988: 109-112. 
Notes: * None of the four North Atlantic MPs were counted. ** Of the four North Atlantic MPs two 
were counted as supporting the left. 
** Of the four North Atlantic MPs two 
were counted as supporting the left. 
Abbreviations: R: A center-right majority coalition government headed by Hartling, including five parties (Liberals, Conservatives, Christians, Center-Democrats and Progress 
Party). L: A center-right minority government headed by Hartling, consisting only of the Liberal Party. C: A center-right minority coalition government headed by 
Hartling, including four parties (Liberals, Conservatives, Christians, and Center-Democrats) and excluding Progress Party from direct influence. G: A “grand coali-
tion”, cross-center majority government headed by either Hartling or Jørgensen or a third politician and including both Social Democrats and non-socialists. S: A 
leftist minority government headed by Jørgensen and including only Social Democrats. 
3. The government preferences of the parties 
 
We shall now attempt to analyze the preferences over government 
alternatives held by the political parties.  The focus largely 
disregards the informal government negotiations in January 1975 as 
well as the first “Queen’s round” later the same month, led by 
Skytte.  The reason is that the informal rounds included no specific 
recommendations but rather comprised a complex and somewhat 
“secret” set of negotiations, and that the first round must be seen 
mainly as a strategic move to avoid Hartling being given the “first 
serve”, and with Skytte not being a candidate for Prime Minister 
himself. 
Instead the focus will be on the three rounds that took place 
February 7th to 11th, as a result of which the political parties 
submitted specific and public “advice” on whom they wanted to 
lead the formation of a government and on what type of 
government they wanted.  Also, at these three stages the stated 
preferences of the parties seemed quite stable; only on two occasions 
did a party make significant changes to its “advice” (the Center-
Democrats changed from the 2nd to 3rd round and the Progress Party 
did so from the 3rd to 4th round), and only in one case did this have 
any important effect.  To a lesser extent prior statements have also 
been taken into consideration.  Ultimately, all “data” are derived 
from the episode’s premier chronicler, the historian Tage Kaarsted, 
who wrote an entire book on the topic (Kaarsted 1988). 
The three rounds, the advice given and most important 
statements made by the parties have been summarized in Table 2.  
In order to make a social choice theoretic analysis of the outcome 
vis-à-vis the preferences of the decision makers, we also need to 
make some plausible assumptions about their preferences, which 
have also been attempted in the table. 
To make such estimates of the preferences is not easy.  The set of 
feasible alternatives may have changed over the government 
formation process (with some alternatives gradually being ruled out 
 16
and others appearing for the first time); strategic signaling and 
information availability may also have affected the evaluation of the 
alternatives and, hence, led to strategic behavior.  Nonetheless, we 
may make some educated guesses given in the alternatives that 
were actually put forth as alternatives and given the knowledge that 
we have about how the main actors of the political parties are 
believed to have viewed them. 
In essence, only two options actually were in play: A government 
headed either by Jørgensen (Social Democrats) or by Hartling 
(Liberals) (cf. Kaarsted 1988: 51f).  However, looking at the actual 
proposals made we may summarize the alternatives put “on the 
table” before the Queen and her Cabinet Secretary during the days 
of February 7th-11th 1975, as well as a few other relevant alternatives 
as being these five: 
 
R: A center-right majority coalition government headed by 
Hartling, including five parties (Liberals, Conservatives, 
Christian, Center-Democrats and Progress Party).10 
L: A center-right minority government headed by Hartling, 
consisting of the Liberal Party only.11 
C: A center-right minority coalition government headed by 
Hartling, including four parties (Liberals, Conservatives, 
Christian, and Center-Democrats) and excluding the Progress 
Party from direct influence.  
                                           
10 This was not suggested specifically but is largely identical to what the 
Progress Party is known to have wanted and what the party recommended at 
the fourth round (cf. Table 2): A so-called “magistrate government”, wherein all 
parties would take part and be assigned a number of cabinet posts 
corresponding to their parliamentary strength.  For the present purposes we 
will view this as essentially identical to the alternative R, since it would have 
given the Progress Party cabinet level influence and some form of veto. 
11 This alternative was not suggested specifically by any party but may be seen 
as “the elephant in the living room”, since it was the status quo and a latent 
possibility.  It is also plausible to see it as the alternative most preferred by 
Hartling and the Liberal Party, albeit one disregarded for tactical reasons in 
favor of a four party coalition government (C). 
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G: A “grand coalition”, cross-center majority government 
headed by Hartling, Jørgensen or a third politician and 
including both Social Democrats and non-socialists.12 
S: A leftist minority government headed by Jørgensen and 
including only Social Democrats. 
 
No mention ever was made of a left-wing coalition government 
including, e.g., the Socialist People’s Party, the Communists, or the 
Left Socialists.  One obvious reason was that such a coalition would 
not have had a majority of its own and would have needed support 
from the Liberals, the Progress Party or at least two of the smaller 
centrist parties, none of which would have seemed likely.  In fact, 
the Left-Socialists made it clear that they would not support a 
government including non-socialists. 
Table 2 summarizes our estimates of preference orderings of the 
ten parties over the five government alternatives. The estimates are 
based in the actual recommendations given and statements made, 
but with a few additional assumptions.  In some cases, an 
interpretation of the preferences over sets of alternatives has either 
been impossible or alternatively the parties have signaled that they 
basically were indifferent amongst them; in these cases the relevant 
alternatives have been placed in brackets with an indifference sign 
(~) between them. 
                                           
12 A specific “grand coalition” including the Social Democrats and at least one 
non-socialist party other than the Radicals was a constant focal point of several 
parties but a specific coalition was never proposed formally.  Among the infor-
mal suggestions were, e.g., a Social Democratic-Liberal coalition (Kaarsted 1988: 
70 & 80) or a Social Democratic-Liberal-Radical coalition (Kaarsted 1988: 68 & 
81).  The former would have had 95 seats (a majority), while the latter would 
have had 108 and been larger than a minimal-winning-coalition (cf. Riker 1962).  
Other suggestions included a Social Democratic-Radical-Conservative coalition 
(Kaarsted 1988: 84 & 96), which would have required at least one more party 
(and most likely two) in order to have a working majority, and even a “national 
government of unity” encompassing more or less all parties except the Progress 
Party and the three parties to the left of the Social Democrats, cf. Kaarsted 1988: 
80f. 
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4. The collective preferences 
 
On the basis of the hypothesized party preferences we may now 
make a social choice examination of the collective preference over 
the alternatives.  This is done in Table 3, where the alternatives are 
compared in head-to-head matchups and tabulated given the 
parties’ number of seats in parliament. 
 
 
Table 3. Head-to-head comparisons of five government alternatives based in 
hypothesized preference orderings of Table 1 (N = 175 MPs). 
 G L C S R 
G 
- 
 
105 > 66 
(4) 
 
86 > 85 
(4) 
 
102 > 73 
 
157 > 24 
(4) 
 
L 66 < 105 
(4) 
 
- 
 
42 > 23 
(110) 
 
89 > 86 
 
68 > 34 
(73) 
 
C 85 < 86 
(4) 
 
23 < 42 
(110) 
 
- 
 
89 > 86 
 
78 > 24 
(73) 
 
S 
73 < 102 
 
86 < 89 
 
86 < 89 
 
- 
 
90 > 43 
(42) 
 
R 24 < 157 
(4) 
 
34 < 68 
(73) 
 
24 < 78 
(73) 
 
43 < 90 
(42) 
 
- 
 
Note: First number is number of seats supporting column alternative; second 
number is number of seats supporting row alternative.  Underlined numbers 
are those of the majority winner of the match-up.  Numbers in brackets are the 
number of seats of parties hypothesized to be indifferent between the compared 
alternatives. The four North Atlantic seats have been left out of consideration 
for the present purposes. 
Abbreviations: R: A center-right majority coalition government headed by Hart-
ling, including five parties (Liberals, Conservatives, Christian, Center-Demo-
crats and Progress Party). L: A center-right minority government headed by 
Hartling, consisting only of the Liberal Party. C: A center-right minority coali-
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tion government headed by Hartling, including four parties (Liberals, Conser-
vatives, Christian, and Center-Democrats) and excluding Progress Party from 
direct influence. G: A “grand coalition”, cross-center majority government 
headed by either Hartling or Jørgensen or a third politician and including both 
Social Democrats and non-socialists. S: A leftist minority government headed 
by Jørgensen and including only Social Democrats. 
 
 
Given these results we may conclude that there certainly was no 
“cyclical” majority; the MPs collectively had a transitive preference 
ordering looking as such: 
 
(1) G > L > C > S > R 
 
A “grand coalition” (G) was the Condorcet winner, while the 
proposal that unraveled Hartling’s government—a five party center-
right government with the Progress Party (R)—was the Condorcet 
loser (i.e., an alternative that is beaten by all other alternatives in 
pairwise majority rule comparisons).  It is noteworthy that the actual 
outcome of the government formation—a Social Democratic, one-
party minority government (S)—was not only not the Condorcet 
winner but in fact ranked fourth of five and thus could have been 
beaten in head-to-head contests by three other alternatives including 
the one almost put into office after the third round. 
Some objections may be raised.  Most fundamentally, we might 
note that the supposed Condorcet winner, a “grand coalition”, is 
extremely unspecified: There was no specific proposal considered 
formally.  None of the alternatives known to have been debated 
during the negotiations in January-February 1975 was able to 
assemble a majority (see note 12).  Accordingly, the supposed 
Condorcet winner may in reality be a winner only because it is left 
unspecified and it may thus be a contrived result and spurious.  In 
that case the Condorcet winner may actually have been neither that 
nor the government that almost was formed (C), but rather the 
relatively unpopular government that was already in place (L). 
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However, there are some possible problems with this analysis.  
First of all, there is—due to assumed indifferences between some 
alternatives—a large number of “indifferent” MPs, e.g., in the 
comparisons of C versus L and L versus R, where the numbers are so 
large that the outcome might go one way or the other, if a choice 
was forced.  Second, the alternatives G and L were never formally 
considered, except with the latter as an implicit possibility (cf. notes 
11 and 12). 
If we had limited the analysis to the specific proposals on the 
table in round 4 (and hence excluded G and L), then we would get 
the social ordering: 
 
(2) C > S > R 
 
In that case, C, a center-right coalition headed by Hartling but 
without cabinet posts for the Progress Party (“the government we 
never had”), would have been the Condorcet winner, beating both 
of the two other alternatives in head-to-head contests.   
 However, we may take a “robustness check” a bit further and try 
to force the cases of indifference.  Specifically, let us assume that the 
parties have Euclidian preferences in the sense that they, everything 
else being equal, prefer alternatives closer to themselves to 
alternatives further away.  Let us also make the general assumption 
that parties, again everything else being equal, will prefer to be in 
government to be outside of it.13 
Given these assumptions, we may say that rather than the left-
wing parties being indifferent between the alternatives C and R, 
they will prefer the former to the latter because it will be more likely 
to behave in a centrist (less right-leaning) way.  On the other hand, 
let us assume that Hartling—often accused of being an “office 
                                           
13 There are exceptions.  The Center-Democrats with only four MPs generally 
made it clear that they did not seek a place in government; however, at the third 
round of government formation they actually agreed to be part of a four-party 
coalition.  The Radicals made it clear that they only wanted a place in go-
vernment if it was a broad majority coalition. 
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seeker”—if push came to shove in a hypothetical match-up – would 
have preferred R (with himself as Prime Minister) to S (with 
Jørgensen in the role). 
 
 
Table 4. Head-to-head comparisons of three government alternatives, with 
forced strict preferences (N = 175 MPs). 
 C S R 
C - 89 > 86 151 > 24 
S 86 > 89 - 90 > 85 
R 24 < 151 85 < 90 - 
For notes and abbreviations, see Table 3. 
 
 
Doing so, we get—again—the ordering (2).  In other words, S, the 
actual winner, was not the Condorcet winner.  In order for S to have 
been able to beat C in a head-to-head comparison, it would be 
necessary for some party other than the Radicals (or a party to the 
left of them) to prefer S to C.  But we know that none of the five 
parties’ behaviors or statements ever even remotely suggested 
Jørgensen, when they had the chance to do so.  In fact, we know that 
four of the five no doubt preferred C to S because they themselves 
were part of C and consistently pointed towards Hartling in rounds 
3 and 4.  So did the Progress Party prefer S to C?  This would go 
against the logic of Euclidean preferences but more importantly 
against the statements by Glistrup that a Social Democrat would be 
unacceptable. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
A social choice analysis suggests that the final outcome of the 
complex 1975 government formation in Denmark was one that was 
not preferred by a majority of the democratically elected 
parliamentarians.  It won for the simple reason that the (at least) 89 
MPs who would have preferred another government split their 
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support, thereby enabling an alternative supported by only 75 of 
them to win. 
Institutions matter (Ostrom 1986).  If the Danish political system 
had had an actual investiture vote or required not simply a plurality 
of MPs behind a government but an actual majority, things might 
conceivably have looked quite differently.  Such a requirement 
would following the third round have forced Hartling’s coalition to 
confront the parliament, including the Progress Party—who in turn 
would have been forced to choose between whether or not to defeat 
a brand-new government before it had had a chance to propose 
anything.  The Radicals are known to have been on record that they 
would not have voted against such a government, and the Social 
Democrats stated that while they would not save such a 
government’s life, they would not vote it down immediately either 
(Kaarsted 1988: 106f).  In contrast, it is at least plausible that a 
Jørgensen government supported by only 75 of 179 MPs might have 
had a hard time surviving an investiture vote.  One might add that 
such scenarios, of course, might have affected the parties’ behavior 
at earlier rounds of negotiations.14 
With this in mind, the case of the 1975 government formation is a 
good exemplification of the possibility of a system of even a 
democratic system failing to deliver an alternative preferred by a 
majority.  It may not happen frequently, but it is obviously not only 
a theoretical possibility. 
 
 
References 
 
Condorcet, M. J. A. N. C. d. ([1785] 1994). An essay on the application of 
probability theory to plurality decision-making. In I. McLean & F. Hewitt 
(Eds.), Condorcet: Foundations of social choice and political theory (pp. 120-156). 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar, translated extracts. 
                                           
14 Cf. Wright and Riker 1989 on the possible relationship between given rules 
(plurality versus runoff) and the number of alternatives coming forth. 
 23
Condorcet, M. J. A. N. C. d. ([1789] 1994). On the form of elections. In I. McLean 
& F. Hewitt (Eds.), Condorcet: Foundations of social choice and political theory 
(pp. 169-189). Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Damgaard, E. (2000). The life and death of government coalitions. In W. C. 
Müller & K. Strøm (Eds.), Coalition governments in western Europe (pp. 231-
263). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Elklit, J. (1999). Party behaviour and the formation of minority coalition 
governments: Danish experiences from the 1970s and 1980s. In W. C. Müller 
& K. Strøm (Eds.), Policy, office, or votes? How political parties in western Europe 
make hard decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kaarsted, T. ([1964] 1969). Regeringskrisen 1957: En studie i regeringsdannelsens 
proces (2 ed.). København: Institut for Presseforskning og Samtidshistorie. 
Kaarsted, T. (1988). Regeringen, vi aldrig fik: Regeringsdannelsen 1975 og dens 
baggrund. Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag. 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2001). An empirical example of the Condorcet paradox of 
voting in a large electorate. Public Choice 107(1-2), 135-145. 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2005). Individ, stat og marked: Studier i rationalitet og politik. 
København: Forlaget Politiske Studier. 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2008). Voting paradoxes under proportional 
representation: Evidence from eight Danish elections. Scandinavian Political 
Studies 31(3), 242-267. 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2013). Election inversions, coalitions and proportional 
representation: Examples of voting paradoxes in Danish government 
formations. Scandinavian Political Studies 36(2), 121-136. 
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P., Klemmensen, R., & Pedersen, M. N. (2008). Højre, venstre 
eller midte? Et empirisk perspektiv på partirummet i dansk politik. In K. 
Kosiara-Pedersen & P. Kurrild-Klitgaard (Eds.), Partier og partisystemer i 
forandring: Festskrift til Lars Bille (pp. 185-213). Odense: Syddansk 
Universitetsforlag. 
McLean, I. & Urken, A. B. (1995). Classics of social choice, I. McLean & A. B. 
Urken (Eds.). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Miller, N. R. (2011). Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and 
public choice). Public Choice 150, 1-25. 
Ostrom, E. (1986). An agenda for the study of institutions. Public Choice 48, 3-25. 
Riker, W. H. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. Yale: Yale University Press. 
Riker, W. H. (1982). Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory 
of democracy and the theory of social choice. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. 
Riker, W. H. (1986). The art of political manipulation. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
 24
Skjæveland, A. (2003). Government formation in Denmark 1953-1998. Aarhus: 
Politica. 
Wright, S. G. & Riker, W. H. (1989). Plurality and runoff systems and numbers 
of candidates. Public Choice 60(2), 155-175. 
 
 
